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Privacy is a contentious legal topic in large part because it defines the
boundaries between the individual and the community and pits the right
to know against the right to be let alone. The world of sports is a partic-
ularly interesting arena for privacy issues. Sports often operate at the
intersection between the individual and the group, the lone athlete and
the team, and the self-absorbed actor and the role model. When athletes
step forward to perform, they often do so in a public setting that attracts
considerable public attention. This is true even when the athletes are
children, whose privacy we usually respect above all others.'
This article discusses four different types of privacy cases that have
arisen recently in the context of sports. The first type, drug testing of
student-athletes, is a fitting place to begin because the cases in this area
have expressly considered whether athletes are entitled to less privacy
than others. The second area involves coaches disclosing information
about team members and the extent to which such disclosures may con-
stitute actionable privacy infringements. The third topic is perhaps sui
generis: It involves an effort by the University of Illinois to inhibit direct
contact with prospective student-athletes by students and faculty who
oppose the use of the Chief Illiniwek mascot. The privacy dimension of
the Illinois case is the University's assertion that its policy was justified,
in part, by the goal of protecting the privacy of athletic recruits. The
fourth topic involves police searches of spectators at a sports event.
These topics suggest the fairly wide range of privacy issues indige-
nous to sports. The courts' analyses of these issues suggest considerable
* Professor of Law, Marquette University.
1. The elevated privacy of children can be seen by such illustrations as the closing of
judicial proceedings involving children and the self-restraint of the press in not naming chil-
dren who are the subject of news reports. On the other hand, children receive little privacy
protection vis-h-vis their parents and diminished privacy when attending school.
2. Another recurring type of case brought by professional athletes involves the right of
publicity, which is closely related to the privacy right of appropriation. See generally J.
Thomas McCarthy & Paul M. Anderson, Protection of the Athlete's Identity: The Right of
Publicity, Endorsements and Domain Names, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. Rnv. 195 (2001); Laura
Lee Stapleton & Matt McMurphy, The Professional Athlete's Right of Publicity, 10 MARO.
SPORTS L.J. 23 (1999).
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uncertainty about whether privacy rights are altered in a sports context.
Indeed, in the cases discussed below, one of the recurring themes is
whether the sports context leads to a diminished expectation of privacy.
The verdict of the courts is far from clear on this point.
DRUG TESTING AND STUDENT-ATHLETES
In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,3 the United States Supreme
Court held that a public school district could require "random urinalysis
drug test[s] of students who participate in... athletic[ ] programs."4 Al-
though this requirement applied only to students in sports programs and
applied irrespective of any particularized suspicion that a student was
using drugs, the Court found no Fourth Amendment violation.5 The af-
fected students suffered a loss of privacy, but the privacy interference
was found to be reasonable, in part because student-athletes have dimin-
ished privacy expectations:
Legitimate privacy expectations are even less with regard to stu-
dent athletes. School sports are not for the bashful. They require
"suiting up" before each practice or event, and showering and
changing afterwards. Public school locker rooms, the usual sites
for these activities, are not notable for the privacy they afford.
The locker rooms in Vernonia are typical: No individual dressing
rooms are provided; shower heads are lined up along a wall, un-
separated by any sort of partition or curtain; not even all the toi-
let stalls have doors. As the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit has noted, there is "an element of 'communal
undress' inherent in athletic participation." 6
There is an additional respect in which school athletes have a re-
duced expectation of privacy. By choosing to "go out for the
team," they voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regula-
tion even higher than that imposed on students generally. In
Vernonia's public schools, they must submit to a preseason physi-
cal exam (James [Acton, respondent,] testified that his included
the giving of a urine sample, App. 17), they must acquire ade-
quate insurance coverage or sign an insurance waiver, maintain a
minimum grade point average, and comply with any "rules of
conduct, dress, training hours and related matters as may be es-
tablished for each sport by the head coach and athletic director
3. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
4. Id. at 648.
5. Id. at 665.




with the principal's approval." Record, Exh. 2, p. 30, 8. Some-
what like adults who choose to participate in a "closely regulated
industry," students who voluntarily participate in school athletics
have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privi-
leges, including privacy.7
This description by the Court of participation in athletic programs
sounds almost militaristic, yet regimentation well beyond the sidelines or
the walls of the gym is accepted as a routine feature of school sports, and
bodily privacy is compromised. Indeed, the athletic regimen spills over
into the student-athlete's academic program, dress, and general conduct.
There is reason to be wary of such an uncritical acceptance of these
wholesale impositions on personal autonomy and dignity. This regimen-
tal model must certainly discourage athletic participation by students
who are freer spirits, or perhaps simply culturally different. Our objec-
tive should be to widely extend to children the benefits of athletic com-
petition, such as discipline, cooperation, perseverance, and goal-setting.
Students should not be discouraged from athletic programs by an over-
reaching regimen that extends beyond the necessities of sports to impose
a single model of proper appearance and behavior.
The diminished expectation of privacy by student-athletes was only
one basis for the Court's holding in Vernonia. The invasion of the stu-
dent-athletes' privacy was further justified by evidence that athletes were
the "leaders" of the school's harmful and disruptive drug culture, and
that use of drugs by athletes increased their risk of "sports-related in-
jury."8 With respect to the relation among sports, drugs, and injuries,
the Court noted that drugs impaired an athlete's judgment, reaction
time, and perception of pain, all of which could contribute to injury.
Given the facts of the case, the Court's decision, thus, seemed to stand
on three principal footings: athletes expect less privacy, they serve as
(negative) role models, and drugs place them at special risk.9
Courts have been required to determine in subsequent cases whether
the holding in Vernonia is specially limited to the drug testing of students
in sports programs. For example, in Earls by Earls v. Board of Educa-
tion,'0 the Tenth Circuit struck down, on Fourth Amendment grounds, a
drug testing policy affecting all students who participate in extra-curricu-
lar activities, including the choir and Future Farmers of America, as well
7. Id. at 657 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989);
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972)).
8. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649.
9. Id. at 657, 663.
10. 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 10302 (Nov. 8, 2001).
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as athletic teams. The court distinguished Vernonia on the basis that the
Vernonia school district established a compelling need to address the
drug problem, while the Tecumseh school district did not. Thus, the case
did not expressly turn on the distinction between athletic programs and
other extra-curricular activities. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit was hesitant
to find that any of the Vernonia Court's characterizations about athletics
(such as diminished privacy expectations, role modeling, risk of injury)
was dispositive of the case before it.
Particularly with respect to athletes' diminished expectations of pri-
vacy, the Earls court held:
The District argues that participants in the extracurricular activi-
ties subject to testing under the Policy, like athletes, have a re-
duced expectation of privacy because: (1) they voluntarily
participate; (2) they occasionally travel out of town on trips where
they must sleep together in communal settings and use communal
bathrooms; and (3) they agree to abide by "the higher degree of
academic and out-of-school rules and regulations of both the Dis-
trict and the OSSAA." Appellees' Brief in Chief at 17. While it
is probably true that the degree of "communal undress" associ-
ated with most of the extracurricular activities in this case is dif-
ferent from the level of "communal undress" among athletes
envisioned by the Supreme Court in Vernonia [sic], we decline to
give that difference, whatever it may be, much weight in our anal-
ysis. We doubt that the Court intends that the level of privacy
expectation depends upon the degree to which particular stu-
dents, or groups of students, dress or shower together or, on occa-
sion, share sleeping or bathroom facilities while on occasional
out-of-town trips. 1
This conclusion should be compared with a recent decision from the
Seventh Circuit in which the court stressed that student-athletes have a
diminished expectation of privacy when compared with students in other
extra-curricular activities, all of whom were subject to the drug-testing
policy at issue in that case.'" The Seventh Circuit found that the dimin-
ished expectation of privacy by student-athletes related particularly to
bodily privacy, such as communal undress, required physical examina-
tions, and the like. Although the court felt required by Seventh Circuit
precedents to uphold the drug testing policy at issue, it did so with obvi-
11. Id. at 1275.
12. Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052, 1063 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Overall,
the expectation of privacy for students in extracurricular activities or with parking permits,




ous reservations about whether Fourth Amendment privacy protections
were being properly safeguarded, at least as to non-athlete students.13
Thus, the implication seems to be that student-athletes do have dimin-
ished privacy protections, at least in relation to bodily privacy.
One additional bodily privacy case involving student-athletes, but not
relating to drug testing, warrants at least passing mention. In Does v.
Franco Productions,'4 intercollegiate athletes at Illinois State University
were videotaped, without their knowledge, in various states of undress in
school restrooms, locker rooms, and showers. The videotapes were sub-
sequently available for sale on the Internet. Although the case is still
pending, claims against those responsible for the videotaping presuma-
bly have a reasonable likelihood of success. Two classes of defendants,
however, have already been dismissed. The Internet service providers
and web site hosts, whose services were used to market the videotapes,
were found to be immune from suit under the Communications Decency
Act, which protects computer services providers from liability for infor-
mation originating from a third party.' 5
The other defendants dismissed in Franco were University officials,
including the President, Athletic Director, and Assistant Athletic Direc-
tor, who allegedly were aware that copies of the videotapes were being
offered for sale but did nothing to stop it, including not even informing
the students whose images were being shown.16 The district court found
that the defendants' inaction did not support a claim for invasion of the
athletes' right to privacy. Some more affirmative, intrusive conduct be-
yond a mere failure to act would have to be established.
While this holding generally comports with well-established princi-
ples,' 7 it is probable that more would be expected of school personnel at
the elementary and secondary levels. College students are on their own
for the most part, but students in the lower grades are usually not re-
garded that way. Courts would be more likely to find an affirmative
duty to protect younger children whose privacy is being invaded. 8
13. Id. at 1066 ("As the previous sections make clear, the judges of this panel believe that
students involved in extracurricular activities should not be subject to random, suspicionless
drug testing as a condition of participation in the activity. Nevertheless, we are bound by this
court's recent precedent in Todd.").
14. No. 99 C 7885, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9848 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 2000).
15. John Does v. Franco Prods., No. 99 C 7885, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8645, at *11 (N.D.
Ill. June 8, 2000) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000)).
16. Id. at *3, *10.
17. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
18. See, e.g., Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 231 (Supp. V 1999).
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PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE FACTS
The Supreme Court has recognized a constitutionally protected pri-
vacy right against disclosure of personal information.19 Tort principles
also protect some private information from public disclosure.20 In addi-
tion, the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act ("the Buckley
Amendment") protects against improper disclosure of information in
records maintained by educational institutions.21 Thus, the privacy of
personal information is protected in a number of ways, particularly from
disclosure by public school officials, such as coaches.
A recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
Gruenke v. Seip, 2 arose from facts that may reflect a common dynamic
on school athletic teams. Sports teams can be like families, and in
Gruenke, this may have been carried to an extreme.
Leah Gruenke was a member of the high school varsity swim team
coached by Michael Seip. During practices, Coach Seip noted Leah's
low energy level, and that she often complained of nausea and made
frequent trips to the bathroom. He also observed changes in her appear-
ance. He suspected Leah was pregnant. So far, so good, but what
should a public high school coach do under the circumstances?
This is what Coach Seip allegedly did:23 Seip asked the assistant
coach to speak with Leah about whether she was pregnant. When Leah
rebuffed this approach, Seip "attempted to discuss sex and pregnancy
with her" directly.24 Next, Seip sent the school guidance counselor and
school nurse to talk to Leah. Leah rejected all these efforts.
Leah's possible pregnancy became the talk of the team. One of the
swimmers' mothers purchased a pregnancy test and gave it to Coach
19. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) provides:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
21. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) ("No funds shall be made available
under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy or
practice of permitting the release of education records (or personally identifiable information
contained therein other than directory information) of students without the written consent of
their parents to any individual, agency, or organization . .
22. 225 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2000).
23. Id. at 296. The case was on appeal from summary judgment in favor of the defendant,
Coach Seip. Id. at 295. The court's recitation of the facts does not carefully distinguish which
facts are uncontested and which are not. The facts from the court's decision presented here




Seip, who encouraged two team members to talk Leah into taking the
test. These two said that Coach Seip would take Leah off the relay team
unless she took the test. Under this pressure, Leah eventually took this
and three subsequent pregnancy tests, the first of which was positive and
the next three were negative.' In the meantime, a physician who served
as an assistant coach informed Coach Seip that swimming while pregnant
would pose no health risk to Leah.26
In Gruenke, the Third Circuit found that the facts alleged constituted
an unreasonable search in violation of Leah's right to privacy under the
Fourth Amendment:
We believe that the standard set forth in Vernonia [sic] clearly
establishes that a school official's alleged administration to a stu-
dent athlete of the pregnancy tests would constitute an unreason-
able search under the Fourth Amendment. Although student
athletes have a very limited expectation of privacy, a school can-
not compel a student to take a pregnancy test absent a legitimate
health concern about a possible pregnancy and the exercise of
some discretion. This is not to say that a student, athlete or not,
cannot be required to take a pregnancy test. There may be unu-
sual instances where a school nurse or another appropriate school
official has legitimate concerns about the health of the student or
her unborn child. An official cannot, however, require a student
to submit to this intrusion merely to satisfy his curiosity. While it
might be shown at trial that the facts are more favorable to Seip,
we cannot say, as a matter of law, that his conduct as alleged by
the Gruenkes did not violate a clearly established constitutional
right.
Here, the swim coach, an individual without any medical back-
ground, allegedly forced Leah to take a pregnancy test. His re-
sponsibilities can be reasonably construed to include activities
related to teaching and training. They cannot be extended to re-
quiring a pregnancy test. Moreover, a reasonable swim coach
would recognize that his student swimmer's condition was not
suitable for public speculation. He would have exercised some
discretion in how he handled the problem. Seip, however, has of-
fered no explanation that could justify his failure to respect the
boundaries of reasonableness.27
25. Id. at 296-97.
26. Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 297.
27. Id. at 301-02.
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Thus, the Gruenke court interpreted Vernonia as establishing that stu-
dent-athletes have a "very limited" expectation of personal privacy. In
addition to finding an unreasonable search, the court found that Coach
Seip violated Leah's right to privacy of information by the numerous
disclosures he allegedly made, including the disclosure of the results of
her pregnancy tests.2" In effect, the court found that the coach might
have invaded the swimmer's privacy by gossiping about her condition.
The desire of a coach to get involved in the lives of members of his
team can be a positive value that facilitates the learning and character
growth thought to be at the core of school athletics. The way that the
team, as a team, addressed the issue of Leah's pregnancy, along with the
involvement of a number of parents, could also be considered positive
steps.
In this connection, though, one startling fact stands out: Leah's par-
ents were not contacted as this drama played out.29 This remarkable
oversight, given the active involvement of other parents, formed the ba-
sis for an additional privacy claim, invasion of familial privacy. The
United States Supreme Court has recently noted that the parental inter-
est in "the care, custody, and control of their children" is "perhaps the
oldest of the fundimental liberty interests recognized by this Court."3
The court in Gruenke held that while schools have some power and re-
sponsibility to supervise and control the behavior of children in their
custody, their authority has limits:
It is not unforeseeable, therefore, that a school's policies might
come into conflict with the fundamental right of parents to raise
and nurture their child. But when such collisions occur, the pri-
macy of the parents' authority must be recognized and should
yield only where the school's action is tied to a compelling
interest.3'
28. Id. at 302-03
(Leah's claim not only falls squarely within the contours of the recognized right of one
to be free from disclosure of personal matters .... but also concerns medical informa-
tion, which we have previously held is entitled to this very protection. If, as Leah al-
leges, the information about her pregnancy tests was confidential, and Seip compelled
Leah to take the tests, his alleged failure to take appropriate steps to keep that infor-
mation confidential, by Seip's having Leah's teammates administer the test and by his
discussing the test results with his assistant coaches, could infringe Leah's right to pri-
vacy under the substantive due process clause.).
(citing Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600; United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570,
577 (3d Cir. 1980)).
29. Id. at 306.
30. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
31. Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 305.
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The Gruenkes asserted that Leah's teenage pregnancy was a family
matter in which the State had no right to interfere. The court agreed,
holding that Coach Seip's alleged conduct amounted to an "arrogation
of the parental role by [the] school.13 2 Nevertheless, the court upheld
dismissal of the claim for invasion of familial privacy on the basis that,
due to the unique circumstances of this case, the right was not clearly
established by prior law. Therefore, Coach Seip was entitled to qualified
immunity.
Gruenke is the most compelling recent example of information pri-
vacy as the basis for a suit by student-athletes, but it is not the only
example. In Doe v. Woodford County Board of Education,33 an action
was brought for violation of the Buckley Amendment34 when a middle
school principal alerted the basketball coach to the plaintiff's health
problems, allegedly within earshot of the plaintiff's teammates.3 The
Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the claim on the basis that disclosure
to the coach was permissible due to a genuine health or safety concern,
and that the plaintiff failed to prove that nearby teammates, to whom
disclosure would not have been permissible, had, in fact, heard any un-
authorized disclosure.3 6
In Wooten v. Pleasant Hope R-VI School District,37 a student brought
a state tort privacy claim for public disclosure of private facts, because
her coach told her teammates and others that she was kicked off the
team for missing a game in order to attend another school's homecom-
ing. In fact, the student was running an errand for her mother. The
court dismissed the claim, finding that Wooten's failure to attend the
game was a matter of public interest, and that the coach's statement that
Wooten missed the game to attend another school's homecoming would
not subject a person of ordinary sensibilities to shame or humiliation.38
The public interest point is particularly interesting. The court found that
Wooten's absence "affected her teammates and, potentially, the success
and reputation of Wooten's team."39 The court did not elaborate on this
conclusion.
32. Id. at 306.
33. 213 F.3d 921 (6th Cir. 2000).
34. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1998). The text of the Buckley Amendment is discussed supra note
21.
35. Woodford, 213 F.3d at 923.
36. Id. at 926-27.
37. 139 F. Supp. 2d 835 (W.D. Mo. 2000).
38. Wooten, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 845.
39. Id.
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It seems sensible to allow coaches to tell their players whether a per-
son is still on the team. It is quite another matter, however, to provide
the reason for a student leaving a team. The reason may be very per-
sonal. For example, it may involve family, health, or educational circum-
stances. Even here, the reason given-that Wooten was attending
another school's homecoming-certainly placed Wooten in a very unfa-
vorable light with her teammates (one of whom was the coach's source
for the erroneous explanation).
Taken together, Gruenke, Doe, and Wooten suggest a set of informa-
tion principles that may sometimes conflict. Coaches should not pry into
their players' private lives nor gossip about them. On the other hand,
there is nothing wrong with coaches acquiring relevant information
about their players and sharing information with team members when
circumstances warrant. Sound judgment may be all that separates prying
and gossiping, on the one hand, from knowing your players and keeping
them adequately informed, on the other. Privacy standards often seem
to involve judgments of this sort.
THE CHIEF ILLINIWEK CASE
The controversy concerning the use of Native American symbols as
mascots and nicknames for sports teams led to an interesting case involv-
ing the University of Illinois. Although privacy issues take a back seat to
free speech concerns in Crue v. Aiken,40 they are nevertheless worth
noting.
In Crue, plaintiffs challenged a University policy that required prior
approval by the Director of Athletics of communications by members of
the University community with prospective student-athletes. The Uni-
versity justified this "Preclearance Directive" on the basis of National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) rules regulating contacts with
prospective athletes and as a means of protecting the privacy of prospec-
tive student-athletes.41
Students and faculty challenged the Directive on First Amendment
grounds as a prior restraint on speech and as an impediment to anony-
mous speech. The court agreed, finding that the University's reliance on
NCAA rules was misplaced. As to students, the court held that NCAA
40. 137 F. Supp. 2d 1076 (C.D. Ill. 2001).
41. Id. at 1086 ("The University's asserted interest is in complying with its obligations as
part of the NCAA, including rules regulating recruitment contact with prospective student




rules prohibit student contact with prospective athletes only "at the di-
rection of a coaching staff member" or if "financed by the institution or
a representative of its athletics interests."'4 As to faculty contacts, the
court held that the rules "are focused on regulating the conduct of those
individuals who are acting on behalf of the University's athletic interests
with respect to matters related to the recruitment of student-athletes." 43
The contacts at issue here relate to a public concern involving the Uni-
versity mascot, a subject "only tangentially related to athletics."'  If the
NCAA rules were interpreted so broadly as to apply to such contacts,
the court expressed its doubt as to whether they would pass constitu-
tional muster, at least when enforced by a public college or university.45
As to the claim that the Preclearance Directive was necessary to pro-
tect the privacy of prospective student-athletes, the court found that
"[t]here has been no showing that prospective students either have been
or will likely be disrupted in their educational pursuits or subjected to
undue pressure by virtue of the limited contact proposed in this case. 46
Some critics of college sports might find it ironic that the athletic
department at a major university is concerned about the privacy of po-
tential athletic recruits and wants to protect them from various forms of
harassment. The public perception of the recruiting scene in big time
college sports is that athletic departments and coaches are the problem
and not the cure. Indeed, the court in Crue understood the NCAA rules
to be an effort to curtail privacy infringements and harassment by ath-
letic departments and their cronies, not by students and faculty anxious
to discuss policy issues on campus.
The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining
order enjoining the University from requiring prior approval of commu-
nications by students and faculty with athletic recruits concerning the
42. Id. at 1084 (citing NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Assoc TION, 2001-02 NCAA
DIVISION I MANUAL, art. 13.1.3.5.2 (2001-02)).
43. Id. at 1087.
44. Id.
45. As an interesting sidelight, the court expressed considerable empathy for individuals
charged with assuring their schools' compliance with NCAA rules:
After listening to Mr. IUe describe the nature of his duties as Compliance Officer with
respect to the NCAA and Big Ten rules, and what is involved in performing those
duties (such as, numerous requests for opinions on a daily basis and over 500 pages of
NCAA rules, often differing in content based on the gender of the athlete and the
particular sport involved), it is clear that he has one of the most demanding jobs that
any University employee could have.
Crue, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1082.
46. Id. at 1090.
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mascot issue. Free speech won out, and college athletic recruits will have
to wait until another day for privacy protection from political activists on
campus.
SEARCHES OF SPECTATORS
Surveillance is common at major public events in order to avoid ter-
rorist actions and other forms of crime. A recent example of the use of
surveillance for a sports event was at Super Bowl XXXV in Tampa,
where local authorities used a biometric identification system that relied
on facial recognition. Here is how the system worked:
Specifically, surveillance cameras surreptitiously scanned specta-
tors' faces to capture images. Algorithms then measured facial
features from these images-such as the distances and angles be-
tween geometric points on the face like the mouth extremities,
nostrils, and eye corners-to produce a "faceprint." This faceprint
was then instantly searched against a computerized database of
suspected terrorists and known criminals to recognize a specific
individual.47
No known or suspected terrorists were arrested as a result of the surveil-
lance at the Super Bowl, but there is every reason to expect that these
efforts to avert tragedy will continue.48
Surveillance in public places does not generally infringe protected
privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment. The rationale is simple,
almost to the point of being tautological: There is no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy for that which one does in public.
Surveillance, however, is legally distinguishable from searches. Al-
though wholesale searches remain common in contexts such as airports
and courthouses, courts are hesitant to extend the contexts in which rou-
tine searches are permitted.49 This aversion to suspicionless searches
was illustrated by a recent decision involving a sports event.
Local police at a charity motorcycle rally held in Spartanburg, South
Carolina engaged in warrantless stops and physical searches of the per-
sonal property of motorcycle riders seeking admission to the event.50
47. JOHN D. WOODWARD, JR., SUPER BOWL SURVEILLANCE: FACING Up TO BIOMETICs
3 (May 2001), available at http://www.rand.org/publications/IP/IP209/IP209.pdf.
48. Id. at 10.
49. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (Fourth Amendment
prohibited city from operating vehicle checkpoints on its roads in an effort to "interdict un-
lawful drugs," id. at 34, where the "primary purpose [of the checkpoints] was to detect evi-
dence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing." Id. at 40.).
50. Norwood v. Bain, 166 F.3d 243, 244 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. de-
nied, 527 U.S. 1005 (1999).
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The police were prompted to make the searches by warnings that rival
motorcycle gangs, with a history of violent confrontations, would be at-
tending the rally. The searches were limited to persons entering on mo-
torcycle (for example, spectators could avoid being searched by parking
their motorcycles off the grounds and entering on foot), and only saddle-
bags and unworn clothing was searched. Police were searching for weap-
ons, and-given the warm temperatures and the tight clothing that the
crowd in attendance was wearing-police believed that these limits on
the searches would still be useful under the circumstances.
On these facts, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had a
devil of a time determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation oc-
curred. In Norwood, the court, hearing the case en banc, divided equally
on whether the search of saddlebags and unworn clothing was reasona-
ble under the relevant factors, which included the government interest
involved, the degree to which the intrusion reasonably advanced those
interests, and the magnitude of the intrusion."' The per curiam opinion
of the court, which resulted in an affirmance of the district court's find-
ing that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of spec-
tators, contained no analysis on the issue. 2 Instead, we are left to
conclude that a law enforcement decision to search spectators at a sport-
ing event (or in any other context) is highly judgmental, based on the
evidence of the risk and the nature of the search conducted.
The security of a sports event will sometimes allow invasions of the
privacy of spectators. A firm basis for these invasions will be required,
however, and the search must be carefully tailored to the risk.
CONCLUSION
Privacy issues have proven difficult to resolve in contemporary
American law and society. It is no surprise, then, that the sports field
draws its share of privacy disputes. Some peculiarities of sports, particu-
larly the extent of public interest and the emphasis on team, have proven
to complicate privacy issues that arise in the sports world. Courts are
grappling with these problems and providing useful guidance for players,
coaches, sponsors, and spectators.
51. Id. at 247-51. For a further analysis of the decision, see Ronald J. Sievert, Meeting the
7wenty-First Century Terrorist Threat Within the Scope of Twentieth Century Constitutional
Law, 37 Hous. L. REv. 1421, 1444-50 (2000).
52. Norwood, 166 F.3d at 245.
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